Introduction
The thrust of nexus thinking is that understanding the causes and implications of resource extraction and consumption require thinking across boundaries of resource categories. The potential pitfalls of expanding the methodological ambit in such ways, however, are significant. Among these pitfalls is that collapsing boundaries renders the questions about resources and environments impossibly complicated and therefore difficult to model, visualize, and communicate. Of course such challenges are not new in scientific inquiry and governance, and there are many possible ways to constrain inquiries so that problems can be semi-isolated for the purposes of understanding them or attempting to govern them. The concept of scale is inherent to nexus thinking and necessary for any fruitful nexus-based analysis. Each nexus dimension -from water to energy to food -crosses scales.
Yet scale is understood and operationalized differently in different fields (and even within single fields). We therefore attempt here to give an overview of scalar thinking in all its heterodoxy as well as offering possibilities for incorporating scalar thinking into the nexus. As the chapter makes clear, contrary to the impression of everything being "global" in scale and scope (e.g., international value chains, global virtual networks), when it comes to resources the interlinkages across scales -from micro to macro -are a central feature of the resource nexus. So, for example, it is well known that "global" economic forces may shape "local" water, food, land, and energy usage and availability in many places around the globe. Such economic forces can impact different countries, cities, or rural areas -or different economic classes -very differently. But less often appreciated is that "global" economic forces cross scales, both in their impacts and in their causes. One cannot explain or govern the impacts of global minerals markets, for example, without attention to the hundreds of millions of consumer decisions and the state, local and firm policies that shape them. Thinking about scale means interrogating and reflecting on concepts framed almost exclusively at one scale, such as "earth governance," "global public goods," or individual purchasing decisions. Similarly, concepts that seem to ignore scale, such as "value-chain management," may hide more than they reveal about the complexity of nexus interactions and challenges without some attention to scale.
The chapter first explores the meaning and utility of the concept of scale, and scalar thinking and analysis, by discussing its use and development in disciplines such as geography and ecology,
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where it is of central intellectual importance and where it has been engaged in resource-related analysis for some time. Next, the chapter seeks to connect the concept more explicitly to the resource nexus, and to analysis in politics, policy and governance. Latter sections explore the connections between scale and resource and climate governance and draw out a few conclusions.
Scalar concepts and analysis
In disciplines such as geography and ecology, scale is a foundational concept that, in spite of a lack of common definitional agreement, provides a sort of unifying vocabulary for thinking through the spatiality of phenomena, events, etc. (Silver, 2008) . Sayre (2009) provides a number of examples of prominent scientists and journalists situating scalar thinking at the heart of their inquiry, from Princeton ecologist Simon Levin who said in his Robert H. MacArthur Award lecture in 1989 that relating phenomena across scales is "the fundamental conceptual problem in ecology, if not all of science" (Levin, 1992 (Levin, , 1944 to journalists Elizabeth Kolbert and Thomas Friedman, who have made similar such claims. The term is used frequently in both colloquial and academic contexts, which gives rise to a considerable lack of clarity of what the concept means and how it can best be used. In common usage, scale is often used interchangeably with "level," and it suggests a nesting of hierarchical levels from the micro to macro or the inverse (e.g., from local to global, with various intermediary steps). In cocktail party usage, one can imagine a retort to someone highlighting having seen a seemingly one-off dead tree in the nearby forest with "The scale of the problem is actually much greater," typically meaning that the localized event of one dead tree is actually situated in a wider -more geographically dispersed -set of occurrences as a result of some systemic set of environmental phenomena.
In the discipline of ecology, scale has both spatial and temporal connotations, and when one considers observing patterns in the environment related to, for example, a species of organism, being explicit about scale makes sense.
When we observe the environment, we necessarily do so on only a limited range of scales; therefore, our perception of events provides us with only a low-dimensional slice through a high-dimensional cake. In some cases, the scales of observation may be chosen deliberately to elucidate key features of the natural system; more often, the scales are imposed on us by our perceptual capabilities, or by technological or logistical constraints. (Levin, 1992 (Levin, , 1945 Levin emphasizes that there is no "correct" scale at which to observe ecosystems, and in fact that what ecologists refer to as a species "community" or "ecosystem" is in fact "an arbitrary subdivision of a continuous gradation of local species assemblages" (Levin, 1992 (Levin, , 1960 . The important takeaway from this for the purposes of this chapter is that like natural resources, ecosystems are not closed systems, but rather are defined by porous borders; the use of scale is nevertheless useful in constraining inquiry and quantifying variability in time and space.
Scale has a long conceptual lineage in geography, first being deployed by cartographers to express the relationship between something represented on a map to space in the world. The fractions associated with "cartographic scale" are usually displayed graphically to relate the map to the world in such a way: 1 unit (cm, inch, etc.) on the map is equivalent to y units in the world being represented on the map. While primarily a representational matter (Sayre, 2009) , cartographic scalar relationships are implicitly asking maps users to think across and make connections among spatial scales, relating what appears on paper or one's smartphone to the environment to facilitate, for example, successful navigation. This relational aspect will be returned to, as it helps to understand what the analytical distinction is between scale and level, two terms that are often use interchangeably in common parlance.
Physical geographers tend to reflect ecologists in treating scale as "the temporal and/or spatial range and magnitude of a process or observation" (Silver, 2008, 922) . Human geographers typically use scale methodologically in order to define the resolution of data collection or constrain analysis to fit a particular set of issues (Gregory et al., 2009) . In that way, scale is more an observational matter than a representational one (Sayre, 2005) . As an example, when a human geographer or other social scientist wishes to study the issue of food availability and hunger, the scale of analysis chosen to take on the question is not simply a matter of location but of granularity of the lens being used to ask the question. A relatively prosperous community in North America, for example, may compare favorably at the aggregate to other communities in terms of percent of the population that is food insecure, but if one focuses on neighborhood scale, pockets of food deserts and high rates of hunger may be found. Typically, then, human geographers attempt to think through the linkages across scales of analysis. In the example of hunger, a change in food availability at the neighborhood scale might hypothetically be tied to changes in global trade patterns that cause price hikes to various commodities. Such a linkage would not be immediately evident if thinking only about neighborhoods in a city or globally about food productions, but the ties between the two phenomena occurring at different spatial scales are nevertheless very important.
Geographers and others involve scale deliberatively in epistemological decisions about approaching research questions and methods, but "scalar thinking" is something that most of us do unwittingly as a cognitive means of making sense of complexities in the environments around us. When it rains, for example, it would be very strange indeed to think about the effects of the rainfall only in terms of some global impact of the precipitation on global water balances or a regional drought. Rather, most observers would cognitively organize the event at multiple scales: the micro-scale effects of the rain on my eyeglasses, to the large puddle forming between me and where I want to walk, to community-and regional-scale impacts on a persistent drought. This scalar thinking is so much a part of daily life that it requires little effort or reflection.
A significant body of literature in recent decades has examined the scalar aspects of water governance. Water is, as Giordano (2003) puts it, a fugitive resource, whose flows and availability varies over time and space as a consequence of human and environmental factors (Feitelson and Fischhendler, 2009 ). The rights regimes that overlay the resource are also rarely perfectly coincident, and as a result, especially in areas of the world where water is scarce, there is potential for conflict and a need for governance regimes that allocate the common resource according to norms of equitability, legal frameworks, etc. (Giordano, 2003) . Feitelson and Fischhendler (2009) provide an overview of the historical evolution of water resource allocation in various contexts, making the case that "The spatial scale determines the areas to which a governance regime pertains and thus the issues and parties with which it has to content" (p728). In water-rich or sparsely populated areas, often water management historically occurred at the household scale, with each household having its own well or open access to a stream. In the case of the American West, household-scale water access came to be managed as an "individual asset," and was married to individual property rights. As the West was developing, though, making water available to encourage widespread settlement and agricultural productivity was also framed as part of a national-scale political imperative, and this gave rise to massive "reclamation" projects by state and, above all, the federal government. These projects sought to impound, divert, and direct water across the largely arid region, but the access regime that focused on individual rights was left largely unchanged (Reisner, 1993) . Over time, as demands on the limited water resources in the West grew and an uncooperative climate brought lengthy droughts to the region, water governance grew increasingly contentious. One could argue that the scalar politics of the household -the socially constructed nature of rugged individualism and rights -thwarted attempts to more effectively manage water usage of key sources such as the Colorado River or California Central Valley aquifers, and it is this mismatch that helps to explain why the Colorado is among the most over-allocated freshwater sources in the world, pitting in various contexts farmer against farmer, city against city, urban against agricultural interests, states against states, and even neighboring countries (US and Mexico) against each other.
Yet the scalar aspects of water governance also provide opportunities for cooperative management. In areas where water is not abundant, water governance is typically at the community or higher scale. The case of Israel and its neighbors offers a good example of the scalar dynamics of water governance, and it also provides some insight into the material as well as the socially constructed elements of scale as it pertains to water resources and their management. Prior to the 1930s, water management for Jews and Arabs in the Levant was largely a community affair, but with the arrival of larger numbers of Jews and "the state-building development ethos espoused by the Zionist movement from the outset" (Feitelson and Fischhendler, 2009, 733) , basin-and interbasin-scale projects were developed, such as the Kishon project started in 1937 (ibid.). With the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, a national-scale effort at water management was introduced, one that sought to encourage development in water-poor parts of the country through large-scale interbasin transfers such as the National Water Carrier that moves water from the Upper Jordan River basin (especially the Sea of Galilee) to communities in the dryer Negev in the south of the country. During the 1980s, a growing environmental movement in Israel successfully lobbied for the construction of wastewater facilities, giving rise to a water governance system wherein freshwater supply is still largely national in scope, while wastewater and drainage is managed at the basin scale.
In Israel, there is of course also a geopolitical and international aspect to water. As part of the peace process of the 1990s, a number of agreements were reached between Israel and its neighbors around issues of water access. That Palestinians and Jordanians experienced greater precariousness of their water supplies than Israel was well known and contentious; how this would be governed in the context of a negotiated peace was touchy on all sides. Feitelson and Fischhendler (2009) point out that the supranational-scale solutions to water supply between Palestinian territories, Israel, Jordan, and other neighboring countries were partial and largely reflected national positions rather than more nuanced, multi-scalar water management regimes that might have served to diminish the importance of international borders (see also Cohen and Frank, 2009) .
Scale figures in the work of nearly all human geographers in a methodological sense, but for a subset of political economy focused geographers, scale becomes the object of inquiry in the sense of thinking through the so-called politics of scale. For example, contrast the flow resource of water described earlier in this section with the another resource nexus-related case, that of the fixed assets of minerals. Scale has been at the center of defining the ways in which inequalities are produced and reproduced. Huber and Emel (2009) , for example, use the 1872 Mining Law in the US -and recent efforts to reform the law -to illustrate a scalar politics around mineral deposits and efforts to capitalize on them. The issue with the law for some was that it was written at a time when small, private mining companies were incentivized to develop mineral resources by offering virtually unlimited rights to explore and extract on publicly owned lands with no requirement for compensating the public for those resources. Over the next century, however, the amount of mining (and the environmental consequences of it) increased dramatically, and the mining companies also were increasingly large, multinational corporations. In the debate over reforming the law to require the payment of royalties, debates involved arguments and counterarguments about implications of such changes locally, nationally, and globally. Mining concerns threatened that their capital would go elsewhere globally to avoid paying such royalties, presenting a tension between the fixed geography of mineral deposits and the highly mobile, increasingly globalized capital seeking to exploit those deposits.
Scale and resource interlinkages
The two previous examples of minerals and water are instructive of how scalar analysis can enrich the understanding of resource issues, but they also underscore the tendency in resource scholarship to place individual resource categories in silos. The story of mineral extraction on public lands in the US is as much a story of the environmental consequences of mining on freshwater and the lands where the mines were located. In 2015, a US Environmental Protection Agency team, while working on a remediation project on the Gold King Mine near Silverton, Colorado, triggered a mine blowout that resulted in the release of 3 million gallons of acid and arsenic-laden mine water into the Animas River (a tributary of the Colorado River), turning the river bright orange and carrying the environmental legacy of a mine that had closed in 1923 downstream to Lake Powell and beyond (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2015). The millions of tons of ore extracted from that mine enriched its owners, but Gold King Mine and the more than 100,000 abandoned mines in the western US, are a considerable liability for other resources, not limited to water, timber, agricultural lands, and fisheries, hanging, as an article in the Atlantic magazine put it, like "chemical swords of Damocles" over the rivers below them (Parker, 2015) . Similarly, the governance of water resources in the western US or the Middle East is part of a broader, interlinked resource issues around agriculture, energy, mineral extraction, etc.
This chapter argues then that, as the resource nexus is developed conceptually and methodologically, issues of scale should be integrated much as they have been in the research on individual resources cited in the section "Scalar concepts and analysis." In some circles this is already occurring. Geographers have recently taken up nexus thinking, and scale has played a key role. In her presidential address to the Royal Geographical Society meeting in 2013, Judith Rees argued
The type and importance of the linkages between the resources in the nexus will vary spatially as will the feasibility and acceptability of measures to reduce external costs and improve overall sustainability and resource use efficiency. Moreover, it will often be the case that changes at multiple spatial scales (community to international) will be needed to reduce resource insecurity, even if the problems manifest themselves at a relatively local level. (Rees, 2013, 280) One of the great challenges in integrating scalar thinking into any host of resource nexus issues is that of factoring negative externalities into analysis, a theme that figures prominently in this handbook (see e.g. Part II). Externalities are often shifted across geographic spaces, time, and scales (Andrews-Speed et al., 2015) . Among the best-known examples of this can be found in US carbon emissions, the costs of which will be borne differentially around the world for decades to come. But even beyond fossil-fuel consumption, the massive resource through-put of the increasingly globalized high-consumptive lifestyles of (largely) urban upper-and upper-middle classes impose myriad externalities around the world and in the future. Who pays the ecological, social, and political costs associated with illicit markets in coltan, diamonds, drugs, weapons, or endangered species, for example? But this is hardly a problem exclusive to illicit markets. Some peoples' beef, oil, or minerals consumption clearly imposes costs on others, whether these costs be toxic or biological pollution, higher food prices, government corruption, or ecological and cultural destruction. In terms of resource interlinkages, the challenge of "governing oil" or "governing beef " are not exclusive to the resource silo in which each one sits. Both can impact water quality and supply across localities and continents, and both can alter the prices, supply, and distribution of water, land, and many foodstuffs.
Scalar concepts in politics, policy, and governance
Scholars in the overlapping fields of political science, international relations, and public policy have usually avoided using (and learning from) the concept of "scale," but they have spent a great deal of time and ink grappling with related concepts. Generally speaking, such fields deploy comparatively state-centric theories and concepts, and thinking more in terms of "levels," which as noted in the section "Scalar concepts and analysis" is a simpler and less nuanced conceptualization. So, for example, for decades nearly every introductory text for international relations has taught students to organize causal factors driving international relations events and outcomes within "levels of analysis." These levels -the international system, the state/society sphere, and the individual -are posited as a way to organize and separate significant causal variables for outcomes (like war) (Nye Jr and Welch, 2013; Rourke, 2008; Singer, 1961) . Since the 1960s, students and scholars have been cautioned against making uncritical choices regarding which level to examine most closely for a given analysis, the need to think about trade-offs between the levels, and indeed whether seeing the world through these levels contributes more to our collective understanding than it restricts. International relations scholarship has often taken these "levels" for granted and treated them as quite static (unlike the "scalar thinking" discussed earlier in the chapter), with debate often revolving around the relative importance of structural and agent-based theories for understanding how actors and institutions shape outcomes at either the system or the state levels (O'Neill et al., 2004) . So, for example, one might seek to understand how global markets shape incentives for rational actors (at any level of scale) around the world, or whether domestic or international system-level factors were the most significant causes of a particular violent conflict, or seek to understand how the foreign policies of particular states and the preferences or identities of their polities shape resource consumption.
Recent scholarship, particularly related to understanding contemporary European politics, and politics and governance related to energy and climate change at multiple scales has often deployed the concept of "multilevel governance" (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Selin and VanDeveer, 2012) . In short, multilevel governance scholarship emerges as politics scholars seek to understand the relationships of institutions, actors, and issues operation across governance scales and jurisdictions. The concept helped scholars understand how urban scale actors interact with each and build networks for common purposes related to climate change mitigation, for example, even as they engage national, transnational, and inter-governmental organizations and institutions (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006) . As such, climate-concerned actors might interact or build links horizontally (with other actors or institutions at a similar "level"), or do so vertically with actors and institutions at levels above or below their own. So, for example, state-level officials in Massachusetts and California might work horizontally with those from other states and provinces in the US, Mexico, and Canada even as they seek to engage joint actions with officials or non-state actors working in local, national, and international organizations (Selin and VanDeveer, 2009 ). Political science, international relations, and public policy scholars often focus on the implications of these multilevel interactions, the opportunities and challenges for policymaking and institution building, and so on. More "scalar thinking" might also seek to understand the changing nature of legitimacy and authority within these interactions, and the ways that individuals', communities', and whole polities' relationships to each other might be changing as a result. Because some multilevel governance scholarship explores the ways that different "levels" constitute each other, and the actors and processes within and across levels, one can see more influence of scalar thinking in some multilevel governance scholarship than is commonly found in political science, international relations, and public policy literatures.
Until recently, the very old traditions of studying the roles and implications of federalism(s) remained largely unconnected to multilevel governance research (Selin and VanDeveer, 2012) and the politics of scale. Comparative federalism scholars often demonstrate the federalist institutions change over time, distributing and redistributing authority, legitimacy, resources, and so on. The structure and operation of federalist structures can have substantial influence on policy outcomes across a host of issue areas. Certainly it is difficult to understand US environmental or climate change politics, movements, policy outcomes, and other dynamics without attention to American federalism (Kamieniecki and Kraft, 2013; Rabe, 2010) , and the same might well be said of many environmental, energy, and climate change-related processes and policies in Germany, Canada, Brazil, or India. While federalist scholars have generally ignored many of the more dynamic and nuanced aspects of the scale concept and scalar thinking -focusing instead on how levels interact or incentive actors differently, for example -it is clear that some of them grapple with similar concerns and processes as those explicitly using the concept. Also, federalism scholars have mostly ignored global and international interactional, and the many transnational links across levels of authority (and the implications of these) (Selin and VanDeveer, 2012) , which greater attention to the concept scale and scalar thinking might addresses.
State centrism, geopolitics, and nexus analysis
Two final points about the state centrism and strategic logic of much political science, international relations, and geoeconomics are worth making. The first regards non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and conceptualizations of civil society, where this large and complex realm of social organization is defined primarily as "not the state." Critics of such state centrism, from a host of disciplines and theoretical perspectives, often note that the exact boundaries of the state -in theory and in empirical practice -tend to be much more difficult to identify than generally assumed. One often sees similar and related challenges in economics, as well. Where does the state end or begin, in a world in which statist institutions (ideas, norms, laws, rules, and so on) can shape fundamental aspects of individual and collective identity, family and community life, sexual and reproductive health, and notions of human rights? Where exactly does one draw lines between interactions that are "in the market" and those shaped primarily by states?
A second concern related to state centrism, with significant implications for resource nexus analysis and institutions, is captured in both the concept of geopolitics and its critiques. Geopolitics emerged as a field of inquiry and a mode of understanding international politics at the turn of the 20th century in Europe. Unsurprisingly it was deeply tied up with European empires' attempts to scientifically rationalize and better understand the impacts of factors such as physical space, resource distributions, technological innovations (especially in the realms of transport and military), and cultural phenomena on the exercise of international affairs. As such, the spatial ambit of geopolitics, conceptually as well as in praxis, was the global scale, but with the clear understanding that local events and phenomena could in fact impact global ambitions.
Although the term was reclaimed after World War II by scholars of international relations as a broader set of questions about strategic statecraft (especially by the postwar superpowers), the term cannot be simply divorced from its imperial origins, with all that those origins portended for things like securing access for the powerful to territories and natural resources they deemed necessary. Lately policy circles have become enamored by the arguably no less problematic term "geoeconomics," a term that seems to suggest that market access, market manipulation, and the relationship between political-cum-military power and economy, has superseded raw power politics as the primary focus of states and corporations in the international context. Yet, the two concepts must be viewed critically as two sides of the same coin (Blackwill and Harris, 2016 ).
The resource nexus, then, if it is to have analytical value, must critically acknowledge and grapple with geopolitical-geoeconomic framings of resource issues. Geopolitics and geoeconomics suggest a particular worldview -and expectation that resources serve and are controlled by (or, should serve and be controlled by) the interests of those with more material power and wealth. To think about and analyze the resource nexus in these types of "strategic" terms suggests little room for community or household level resource concerns, and precious little attention to equity, justice, or human rights frameworks, for example. If water and food are treated as primarily strategic resources -as is common in scholarship and policymaking about oil, uranium, or a particularly desirable rare earth mineral -does nexus analysis assume that those with less material power and wealth get none? Does it assume they will either have to become the highest bidder for scarce resources, or resort to taking what they need by force in order survive? If the answers to these questions are "no," than geo-strategic views (among others) of resource competition and governance must address how and why resource governance institutions can (or should) embody values, worldviews, rules or other social institutions beyond strategic logics based on power and wealth.
Linking scale to resource and climate governance research
A spate of recent work in various fields has sought to incorporate scalar thinking into questions of environmental and resource governance. Along similar lines, a number of scholars in the field of global environmental change have called for attending to definitional and methodological shortcomings in how scales of analysis are conceptualized and operationalized. An important intervention from over 25 years ago is still relevant today:
To address adequately the human dimensions of global environmental change poses a formidable challenge. A reconciliation of two competing trajectories in the social sciences will be required -of those tending towards understanding through broad, macro scale social forces that affect nature-society relationships with those tending towards understanding through the complexity of these relationships in their local space-time contexts. (Turner et al., 1990) A similar point can be made about nexus thinking and governance. Even if scientists were able to agree on the appropriate scale of governance for a particular issue, such a consensus inevitably hits up against the inflexibility of the scales of governance available to address problems. In no area has this been more apparent in recent decades than in debates over climate change, but it extends to a host of other issues: the territorialization of political decision-making in cities, regions, and above all, sovereign nation-states, make the scalar politics of governance far from simply an academic question. Water, again, provides an interesting case study. As the European Union (EU) progressively rescaled more and more governance areas from the national level to the supranational level over many decades, water management emerged as an area where national management of a flow resource that by definition crosses borders without deference to political lines and provided a key test case of how to supranationalize environmental issues. The solution, which emerged in the early 2000s, was the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) (Johnson, 2012) . It mandated that EU member states work with neighboring states where there was a shared river basin in order to manage the cross-border flows of water for purposes of monitoring and improving water quality. In this instance, there was a clear instance where the territorialization of decision-making was sorely lacking, and the EU provided a political venue through which to re-negotiate the inadequacies of political borders that emerged historically for many reasons other than which way water happened to run off and sought to provide a new "scalar fix" to the issue. The EU's WFD has not been without its critics or challenges in implementation, but there it represents a contemporary case of where scale the scale of a governance challenge is tackled in the policymaking realm.
Geographer Harriet Bulkeley has critiqued the taken-for-granted use of scale and space in governance circles as nested, hierarchical, and biased towards thinking that the macro necessarily is more important than the micro (Bulkeley, 2005) . Much of her subsequent work, then, has sought to escape what has been referred to as the "territorial trap" of much international relations and political science literature (Agnew, 1994) by examining non-hierarchical, networked forms of governance around environmental challenges such as climate change (e.g., Bulkeley, 2012) and has spawned a host of interdisciplinary work challenging the assumption that a truly global problem such as climate change (albeit one with profoundly localized consequences) can only be governed at the global scale and within the context of traditional sovereign states acting in tandem with one another (Bulkeley et al., 2014) . Examining these issues through scalar lenses, considering the polycentricity of decision-making related to the environment (Osofsky, 2013) , is a profoundly helpful corrective. Bulkeley and her colleagues argue that while paying more attention to various levels of scale in climate governance -i.e., getting beyond the attachment to the "global" -enriches our understanding of governance processes, actors, institutions and outcomes, it must not tacitly assume that "different levels of governance are rather neatly separated from one another in distinct jurisdictional levels" (p184). When one sees discrete and different levels, one often focuses on how these levels interact. Yet, attention to governance operating at various levels and across various levels must also attend to the ways that such governance can shape or reshape the levels and/or the governance itself. So, for example, the emergence of multiple and varied carbon markets at various levels of scale -global, national, and subnational, for example, but also within and among firms and civil society organizations as well as within a particular public sector jurisdiction or between such jurisdictions -helps drive the creation of varies processes like carbon trading and carbon accounting across scales. Such dynamics change actors, behaviors, and institutions in the public, private, and civil society sectors -which in turn create various constituencies and norms across and within scales. These changes help implications for governance that may extend well beyond the functioning of a particular regulated carbon market.
Political science and international relations scholars Andonova and Mitchell (2010) catalogued the struggles with, and growing acceptance of, the ongoing "rescaling of global environmental politics." They state:
An international sphere dominated by interaction among nation-states has been replaced by one in which international organizations, substate governments, scientists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations play major roles.
Their work treats global environmental politics and increasingly complex and interconnected, rather than a set of statist processes and actors operating primarily at a global or international level. Such work, like that of Bulkeley and her colleagues, has much to teach analysts of resource-related dynamics about the ongoing "vertical and horizontal rescaling across political arenas, actors and issues" (p273). So, for example, Ken Conca's Governing Water (2006) explains the challenges to building effective international water-related governance institutions by exploring the substantial differences in norms and values that are institutionalized across different transnational and local organizations and communities. Furthermore, Ostrom and her colleagues' work (Brondizio et al., 2009; Dolšak and Ostrom, 2003; Ostrom, 2009) demonstrates that governance is also rescaled through of proliferation of centers of authority and coordination, leading them to examine this increasing common phenomenon via a "polycentric approach." As such, the resource nexus approach not only challenges us to understand governance in similar ways, but to focus greater attention of the interactions, dynamics, challenges, and opportunities in the spaces between one or more resources. While energy politics and governance -and water or food politics and governance -might be understood has having multiple centers and critical levels, examining the interactions of these resource governance silos might well "rescale" understanding. Perhaps, for example, premier centers of research or of rulemaking regarding the food-energy-water nexus are differently identifiably located than key processes or actors in any one of the resources. Long-standing national and international energy organizations like the International Energy Agency (IEA) or the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) might well not be the places producing the highest quality data and analysis about the food-energy-water nexus, for example. Furthermore, this nexus might look much different at local and urban scales -or in more or less arid regions -than it does in globally framed quantitative assessment models or international trade datasets.
One might also focus on the ways in which mining or minerals governance has been rescaled over the last 20 years. Thousands -perhaps tens of thousands -of mining-related protests; activist and media attention to myriad corruption and environmental scandals; a proliferation of activist campaigns to "clean up" gold, copper, and iron-ore mining; and a growing set of certification schemes, codes of conduct, and transnational transparency and accountability campaigns have changed the way mining, manufacturing, and retailing firms, states, and international organizations collect and analyze mining-related information and how they seek to govern mining operations and minerals trade and use (Andrews-Speed et al., 2015; Bleischwitz, 2014; VanDeveer, 2013 VanDeveer, , 2015 . Few would say that the industry, or its governance at local mining sites, international markets, or transnational organizations, is unchanged from 20 years ago. Some activist tactics or particular pieces of information in one location, or in one governance forum like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative or the industry-supported International Council on Mining and Metals, can alter ideas, practices, or expectations in other locations or fora. Furthermore, governance rules and expectations change, sometimes becoming more restrictive, illicit markets in some minerals can expand to become an important fraction of international trade , posing additional governance challenges. As more attention is paid to the roles of minerals and mining within a resource nexus framework -as these related to water, food or land use, quality and prices, for example -one might well expect more changes in governance practices from artisanal mining areas or giant corporate mines to national and transnational and global venues such as the Brazilian or EU law making or the World Bank. Meanwhile, global commitments such as those embodied in the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change may well shape changes across some areas of energy policy-related coal consumption and mining in some countries and localities, while in other regions and states coal mining and consumption may continue to grow rapidly, given differing political, social, and economic dynamics (Boersma and VanDeveer, 2016) .
Returning to questions of resource nexus governance, scalar thinking asks us to understand governance as much more than the tracking and regulation of a particular resource (like water) across different jurisdictions and levels of authority. So, for example, Andrews-Speed et al. (2015) identified a host of gaps and asymmetries in basic data about resource use, flows, and interactions at local, national, and global scales. What might data monitoring and analysis institutions look like and how would they operate, if we wanted them to produce much more robust local, national, and global scale data? If we take the resource nexus approach seriously, we cannot rely (exclusively or primarily) on international market values and institutions to often determine what data is available about the food eaten by the globe's two billion poorest people, or the amounts of water used in energy or agricultural production or contaminated by minerals mining and processing and other industrial uses. Taking nexus connections and challenges seriously requires not just more data -which indeed is needed -but also different data and different analytical goals and institutions if various needs related to human security and sustainability are to be prioritized with economic growth and state security. Furthermore, how might politics and governance change if local communities, residents of large urban areas, and national citizenries had ready access to more high-quality information about resource use and resource nexus interactions, as well as their current and future ramifications?
Data, knowledge, and information also have scalar dynamics, of course. They always have organizational and institutional contexts, and their links to different actors, organizations, and processes shape their creation, use, and interpretation. Information and knowledge about resources -such as that produced by intergovernmental mentor organizations like the IEA, the World Bank, or the UN Environment Program -is inevitably shaped by the institutional structures in which it is produced. Scalar thinking suggests that both the international organizations and the knowledge they produce is more than mere products of the interaction among states (Andonova and Mitchell, 2010) . Actors, institutions, and political processes across a host of issues, disciplines, and actor types shape the processes by which "global" data is produced and how it is understood. Naturally, such influences also help to explain what data is not gathered or assessed.
Conclusion
Scalar thinking about the resource nexus does not merely ask us to consider connections between local actions and global processes. Among other things, it asks to think about how different many aspects of governance would be if we take seriously the growing challenges identified and analyzed via the nexus framework. What governance institutions, for example, would value knowledge about the food eaten by the "bottom billion" as highly as knowledge about the most valuable of the grains traded internationally? What governance institutions would facilitate the inclusion of substantially more of externalities associated with fossil-fuel extraction and use and/or minerals mining, processes, transportation, use, and disposal? What governance institutions -in which kinds of places -help to balance the high monetary value of oil, gas, or minerals extraction with the general much cheaper prices of food and water? Questions such as these bring resource nexus analysis and governance into direct contact with conceptions of equity, justice, ecological value, and/or human rights. Furthermore, if policymakers or activists are successful in some places, and balancing resource extraction, externalities, individual and community needs, and conceptions of fairness, what governance institutions protect other people and ecosystems bearing the burden of human rights and environmental protection elsewhere? The fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reviewed vast bodies of research relating to the overlapping challenges of climate change, human security, sustainable development, and equity (Adger et al., 2014; Fleurbaey et al., 2014) . If analysis or policymaking related to resource nexus challenges -in the public, private, and civil society sectorsis to improve governance or the knowledge intended to inform governance decisions, it cannot ignore scalar thinking or the many complexities surrounding conceptions of human security, sustainable development, and equity across scales.
This chapter argues that scale matters more than in often acknowledged. Analytically, it involves more than simply listing a few "levels" but rather requires a more systematic incorporating of scalar thinking into a host of resource-related questions. Just as global environmental politics and governance have been "rescaled" (Andonova and Mitchell, 2010) , so too must resource nexus analysis and governance.
